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Practice paper — BNS Chapter III — General Exceptions

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1.What is the core principle contained in Section 14 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law)?
- (A) An act done by a person who is actually bound by law, or who in good faith by reason of a mistake of fact believes himself to be bound by law, is not an offence.
- (B) Any act done under orders from a superior officer is not an offence.
- (C) Mistake of law provides a defence if the person honestly believed the law required the act.
- (D) Only public officers are protected when they act under a belief of being bound by law.
2.In illustration (b) the officer arrests Z after "due enquiry" believing Z to be Y. What legal point does this illustration demonstrate under Section 14?
- (A) An officer who arrests the wrong person is always guilty of an offence.
- (B) An officer is protected only if the arrested person later turns out to be the correct person.
- (C) An officer who, after due enquiry, in good faith believes Z to be Y and arrests Z has committed no offence.
- (D) Due enquiry converts a mistake of law into a mistake of fact, so the officer is protected.
3.Section 15 protects a judge's act only when the judge is 'acting' in which manner?
- (A) Administratively
- (B) Judicially
- (C) Privately
- (D) Politically
4.If a judge knowingly exercises a power that he knows is not given by law (i.e., his belief is not in good faith), is his act protected from being an offence under Section 15?
- (A) No — protection does not apply if the belief is not in good faith
- (B) Yes — protection applies regardless of the judge's state of mind
- (C) Only if the act was done in open court
- (D) Only if the legislature subsequently validates the act
5.If a person executes an order while it remains in force but actually knows that the issuing Court lacked jurisdiction, is the act protected under Section 16?
- (A) Yes; the act is always protected if done pursuant to a court order in force.
- (B) Yes; lack of jurisdiction of the Court is immaterial under Section 16.
- (C) No; protection requires that the person in good faith believes the Court had such jurisdiction.
- (D) Only if the person is acting under statutory authority as well.
6.According to Section 17 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, when is an act not an offence?
- (A) Only when it is done by a public servant in performance of duty
- (B) When it is done by a person justified by law
- (C) When it is done by a person who is justified by law, or who, by reason of a mistake of fact (and not of law) in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law
- (D) Only when it is done under a court order
7.If a person acts believing himself justified by law but that belief is not held in good faith, is the act protected by Section 17?
- (A) Yes, any belief of justification is sufficient
- (B) No, protection requires the belief to be held in good faith
- (C) Yes, but only if the belief is a mistake of fact
- (D) Yes, if the person reports the act promptly to authorities
8.Which combination of elements must be present for an act to be excusable under Section 18?
- (A) Accident or misfortune; absence of criminal intention or knowledge; lawful act; lawful manner; lawful means; proper care and caution.
- (B) Accident; lawful act; and absence of criminal intention only; manner, means and care need not be satisfied.
- (C) Lawful act and proper care only; criminal intention or knowledge is irrelevant.
- (D) Only that the act was done in a lawful manner; accident and intention are irrelevant.
9.Does Section 18 excuse an accidental harmful result when the act, though lawful, was done in an unlawful manner or by unlawful means?
- (A) Yes; accident alone is sufficient to excuse the act regardless of manner or means.
- (B) No; the provision requires the act to be done in a lawful manner and by lawful means, so unlawful manner or means defeats the excuse.
- (C) Yes, provided there was no criminal intention; manner and means are irrelevant.
- (D) Only if the victim consented to the act.
10.In Illustration (a) (the vessel scenario), A alters course to avoid running down boat B and thereby runs down boat C. Under Section 19, when would A not be guilty of an offence?
- (A) A is guilty because he ran down boat C.
- (B) A is not guilty only if he warned the passengers of boat C beforehand.
- (C) A is not guilty if it is found as a matter of fact that the danger A intended to avoid (to boat B) was such as to excuse incurring the risk to boat C.
- (D) A is guilty unless he had a specific intention to save only the passengers of boat B.
11.What is the legal effect of an act done by a child under seven years of age under Section 20 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
- (A) The act is not an offence.
- (B) The act is punishable by a reduced fine.
- (C) The act must be tried by a juvenile court.
- (D) The act attracts a mitigated sentence.
12.A child who is exactly seven years old commits an act. Under Section 20, is that act necessarily not an offence?
- (A) Yes — seven years is covered by the provision.
- (B) Yes — all children are immune under Section 20.
- (C) No — 'under seven years of age' excludes a child who is exactly seven.
- (D) Only if a probation officer certifies the child is incapable.
13.Which age description precisely matches the age range referred to in Section 21?
- (A) A child above seven years of age and under twelve years of age.
- (B) A child from seven to twelve years inclusive.
- (C) A child under seven years of age up to twelve years inclusive.
- (D) Any person under twelve years of age.
14.Under Section 22 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, when is an act treated as not being an offence?
- (A) When the person, by reason of unsoundness of mind at the time of doing it, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law.
- (B) When the person is of unsound mind at any time in their life, regardless of their state at the time of the act.
- (C) When the person later becomes of unsound mind after committing the act.
- (D) When the person was intoxicated even if they understood the nature of the act.
15.Does Section 22, as worded, explicitly make voluntary intoxication a ground for 'nothing being an offence'?
- (A) Yes — it expressly includes intoxication within unsoundness of mind.
- (B) Yes — but only if intoxication was involuntary.
- (C) Yes — but only if accompanied by a diagnosed mental disorder.
- (D) No — the provision refers specifically to unsoundness of mind and does not mention intoxication.
16.Which condition is explicitly required by Section 23 for the intoxication defence to apply?
- (A) The thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
- (B) The intoxication must have been voluntary.
- (C) The person must be medically certified as insane at the time.
- (D) The act must be trivial or minor in nature.
17.Which of the following scenarios would NOT be covered by Section 23 despite the intoxication being involuntary?
- (A) A person secretly drugged who nevertheless knew both the nature of his act and that it was wrong or contrary to law.
- (B) A person secretly drugged who was thereby incapable of knowing the nature of his act.
- (C) A person secretly drugged who was thereby incapable of knowing that his act was wrong or contrary to law.
- (D) A person secretly drugged who was unaware he had been drugged and lacked understanding of the legal character of his act.
18.An offence requires particular intent. A person voluntarily becomes intoxicated and then performs the act without the specific intent he would have had sober. Under Section 24, what is the legal effect?
- (A) He is acquitted because he lacked the specific intent while intoxicated.
- (B) He shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated.
- (C) He faces only civil consequences but not criminal liability.
- (D) He is immune from prosecution because voluntary intoxication is a complete defence.
19.Under Section 25, when is an act not an offence despite causing harm to a consenting adult?
- (A) When the harm was intended by the doer even if it causes death or grievous hurt.
- (B) When the act is not intended to cause death or grievous hurt, is not known by the doer to be likely to cause such, and the person above eighteen has given consent.
- (C) When any person (including minors) has given consent.
- (D) When the doer was ignorant of the age of the person consenting.
20.If the doer knows an act is likely to cause grievous hurt, can consent still negate criminality under Section 25?
- (A) It is always an offence if the doer knows the act is likely to cause grievous hurt.
- (B) Consent can never negate criminality if grievous hurt is possible.
- (C) It is not an offence only when the harm is minor.
- (D) It is not an offence if the consenting adult has consented to take the risk of that harm.
21.Who must give consent for the protection under Section 26 to apply?
- (A) A statutory authority acting on behalf of the person
- (B) Any bystander or relative of the person
- (C) The person for whose benefit the act is done (express or implied).
- (D) The doer of the act
22.If the doer knows the act is likely to cause death but does not intend death, and the act is done in good faith for the person's benefit with that person's consent, is it an offence under Section 26?
- (A) Yes — knowledge that death is likely makes it an offence regardless of consent.
- (B) Yes — it is an offence unless the consent is given in writing.
- (C) No — the provision covers cases even where the doer knows the harm is likely, if done in good faith for benefit and with consent.
- (D) Yes — it becomes murder if death actually occurs.
23.A guardian, in good faith, has a child undergo surgery to cure a serious disease. The surgeon knows the operation is likely to cause the child's death but does not intend to cause death. Under Section 27, is the act an offence?
- (A) Yes — any act likely to cause death is an offence irrespective of intent
- (B) Only the guardian is guilty, not the surgeon
- (C) No — if done in good faith to cure the child and without intention to cause death, it is not an offence
- (D) It is an offence unless the child gives consent
24.Under Section 28(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, a consent is NOT such a consent if it is given by a person under which of the following circumstances?
- (A) Fear of injury
- (B) Voluntary free will after full information
- (C) Misconception of law
- (D) Being an adult who understands consequences
25.Under Section 28(b), in which situation is consent given by a person due to intoxication treated as NOT such a consent?
- (A) Whenever the person is intoxicated at all
- (B) If intoxication merely affects the person's mood but not understanding
- (C) If the person is intoxicated but still able to understand the nature and consequence
- (D) If from intoxication the person is unable to understand the nature and consequence of what they consent to
26.Which of the following scenarios is expressly covered by the rule in Section 29 (per the illustration)?
- (A) A surgeon removes a benign tumor with the patient's consent.
- (B) Two adults consent to a mutual fight during a sport match.
- (C) Causing a miscarriage (even with the woman's or guardian's consent), unless done in good faith to save her life.
- (D) A person consents to a cosmetic procedure that causes temporary pain.
27.Under Section 30 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, when is an act not an offence despite causing harm to the person on whom it is done?
- (A) When it is done in good faith for that person’s benefit, even without consent, because consent cannot be signified or the person is incapable and no guardian can be reached in time.
- (B) When it is done in good faith for that person’s benefit only if that person has expressly refused consent.
- (C) When it is done for mere pecuniary benefit to that person without their consent.
- (D) When it is done in good faith for the benefit of the person but only if a guardian later ratifies it.
28.Which of the following correctly states how Section 30 treats abetment?
- (A) Section 30 never protects abetment; abetment is always an offence regardless of circumstances.
- (B) Section 30 does not exclude abetment where the underlying act is one to which the exception extends; abetment is excluded only for offences to which the exception would not extend.
- (C) Section 30 expressly protects abetment even when the underlying act is an intentional causing of death.
- (D) Section 30 makes abetment an offence only if the abettor acted with criminal intent.
29.If a communication is made in good faith and causes harm to the recipient, but the communication was not made for that recipient's benefit, is it protected from being an offence under Section 31?
- (A) Yes — good faith alone is sufficient for protection.
- (B) Yes — provided the harm was accidental.
- (C) No — protection applies only when the communication is made for the benefit of the person to whom it is made.
- (D) No — protection applies only if made by a medical professional.
30.Which offences are excluded from the protection provided by Section 32 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
- (A) Murder only
- (B) Offences against the State punishable with death only
- (C) Murder and offences against the State punishable with death
- (D) Any offence punishable with death
31.Which of the following persons is entitled to the benefit of Section 32 as illustrated by the provision and its explanations?
- (A) A person who, of his own accord, joins a gang of dacoits knowing their character
- (B) A smith seized by a gang of dacoits and forced by threat of instant death to use his tools to break in
- (C) Both the person who joined the gang and the seized smith
- (D) Neither the person who joined the gang nor the seized smith
32.Which of the following circumstances does Section 33 explicitly cover when deciding that an act is not an offence (provided the harm is sufficiently slight)?
- (A) Only where the act causes harm but was neither intended nor known to be likely to cause harm.
- (B) Only where the act was accidental and not intended.
- (C) Where the act causes harm, or is intended to cause harm, or is known to be likely to cause harm, provided the harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain.
- (D) Only where the person did not know the act was likely to cause harm.
33.Which standard does Section 33 use to assess whether harm is 'so slight' as to make the act non‑criminal?
- (A) The subjective view of the injured person (whether that person complains).
- (B) The objective test of whether no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
- (C) A legal expert's assessment of harm under statutory minima.
- (D) A 'reasonable person' standard defined by specific statutory criteria elsewhere.
34.If a person causes harm while exercising the right of private defence, how does Section 34 describe that act?
- (A) It is punishable as a serious offence such as grievous hurt or homicide.
- (B) It is an offence only if the harm is disproportionate.
- (C) It is not an offence.
- (D) It is subject to administrative sanction but not criminal proceedings.
35.According to Section 35, subsection (a), what does a person have a right to defend?
- (A) His own body and the body of any other person against any offence affecting the human body
- (B) His property, whether movable or immovable
- (C) Only his own body (not the body of others)
- (D) Only the body of another person, not his own
36.Is the right of private defence under Section 35 absolute and without limitation?
- (A) Yes, every person has an absolute right of private defence under Section 35
- (B) No, it is subject to restrictions in Section 36
- (C) No, it can be exercised only with prior judicial permission
- (D) No, it is subject to the restrictions contained in Section 37
37.Which of the following is NOT listed in Section 36 as a reason that an act which would otherwise be an offence may not be that offence?
- (A) Youth
- (B) Unsoundness of mind
- (C) Misconception on the part of the person doing the act
- (D) Mistake of law
38.If an act would otherwise be an offence but is not that offence because the actor was intoxicated, what does Section 36 say about the victim's right of private defence?
- (A) No — the victim retains the same right of private defence as if the act were that offence.
- (B) Yes — the victim loses the right of private defence because the actor is not criminally liable.
- (C) The victim may use only non-lethal force because the actor was intoxicated.
- (D) The victim's right exists only if the intoxication was involuntary.
39.Which situation is specifically covered by Section 37(1)(c) as removing the right of private defence?
- (A) When the attacker is a public servant acting in bad faith
- (B) When the defender is certain the act will cause death or grievous hurt
- (C) When there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities
- (D) When the act is done under colour of office but is strictly justifiable by law
40.Which of the following assaults is explicitly included in Section 38 as permitting the voluntary causing of death in private defence?
- (A) An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust.
- (B) An assault intending only to cause simple hurt.
- (C) An assault intending to insult modesty.
- (D) An assault intending to commit theft.
41.Which statement correctly describes the scope of the right to voluntarily cause death under Section 38?
- (A) The right is absolute whenever any one of the listed assaults occurs.
- (B) The right is subject to the restrictions specified in Section 37.
- (C) The right applies only when the accused's act amounts to culpable homicide.
- (D) The right applies only if the assailant is armed.
42.If a person inflicts grievous hurt (but not death) on an assailant and the offence is not one described in Section 38, is this covered by Section 39?
- (A) Yes, without any restrictions
- (B) No, grievous hurt is treated as equivalent to causing death
- (C) Yes, but only under the restrictions specified in section 37
- (D) Only if the assailant was armed
43.According to Section 40, when does the right of private defence of the body commence?
- (A) As soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence, even if the offence has not been committed
- (B) Only after the offence has actually been committed
- (C) Only when there is a danger to property as a result of the offence
- (D) When the apprehension of danger is unreasonable but persistent
44.Which of the following best reflects the requirement in Section 40 regarding the nature of the apprehension for the right of private defence to commence?
- (A) Any apprehension, whether reasonable or not, will commence the right
- (B) Only apprehension regarding property triggers the right
- (C) The apprehension must be reasonable for the right to commence
- (D) Apprehension is irrelevant if there is an attempt to commit an offence
45.According to Section 41, in which time period does 'house-breaking' permit the extension of private defence of property to causing death?
- (A) After sunrise and before sunset
- (B) After sunset and before sunrise
- (C) At any time of day
- (D) Only at noon
46.Section 41 refers to 'the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which' in relation to offences listed. Does the provision therefore cover attempts as well as completed offences for the listed categories?
- (A) No, it covers only completed offences
- (B) Yes, it covers both committing and attempting to commit the listed offences
- (C) Only attempts that result in injury are covered
- (D) Only attempted robbery is covered, not attempts of other listed offences
47.If a person is defending against a theft (not of any description specified in section 41) that occasions the exercise of private defence, may the defender voluntarily cause harm to the wrong-doer?
- (A) Yes; the right extends to causing any harm other than death, subject to the restrictions in section 37
- (B) No; the right does not allow causing any harm
- (C) Yes; including causing death if necessary
- (D) Only if the offence is also an attempt to cause harm
48.When does the right of private defence of property commence under Section 43?
- (A) When a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences.
- (B) When actual damage to the property has occurred.
- (C) When the offender first enters the property.
- (D) When the public authorities are notified.
49.In the case of house‑breaking after sunset and before sunrise, the right of private defence of property continues as long as:
- (A) The house‑trespass which has been begun by such house‑breaking continues.
- (B) Until sunrise irrespective of whether trespass continues.
- (C) Until the offender is arrested by public authorities.
- (D) Until the owner recovers the property from the offender.
50.In the illustration under Section 44, A fires on a mob and, in doing so, harms children mingled with the mob. What is A's criminal liability according to the provision?
- (A) A is guilty of murder for causing death to any child.
- (B) A is liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
- (C) A commits no offence if by so firing he harms any of the children.
- (D) A is liable to civil damages but not criminal prosecution.

Answer key

1. A2. C3. B4. A5. C6. C7. B8. A9. B10. C11. A12. C13. A14. A15. D16. A17. A18. B19. B20. D21. C22. C23. C24. A25. D26. C27. A28. B29. C30. C31. B32. C33. B34. C35. A36. D37. D38. A39. C40. A41. B42. C43. A44. C45. B46. B47. A48. A49. A50. C

Explanations

1. (A) Section 14 states that nothing is an offence if done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it. This protects both actual legal duty and a good-faith mistake of fact about being bound by law.
2. (C) Illustration (b) shows that A, an officer of a Court, being ordered to arrest Y and, after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z and has committed no offence. It demonstrates protection where a good-faith mistake of fact occurs after inquiry; it does not say mistake of law is converted.
3. (B) The provision specifies protection when a Judge is "acting judicially." It does not extend that protection to administrative, private, or political acts.
4. (A) Section 15 protects acts done in the exercise of a power "which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law." If the belief is not in good faith (i.e., the judge knows the power is not given), the protection does not apply.
5. (C) Section 16 conditions the protection on the person "doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction." If the person knows the Court lacked jurisdiction, the required good faith belief is absent and the protection does not apply.
6. (C) Section 17 states that nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be justified by law. Thus both actual justification and a good-faith mistake of fact are covered.
7. (B) Section 17 protects a belief that one is justified by law only when the belief arises from a mistake of fact and is held in good faith. If the belief is not in good faith, the protection in the section does not apply.
8. (A) Section 18 requires accident/misfortune, absence of criminal intention or knowledge, that the act be lawful and done in a lawful manner by lawful means, and with proper care and caution. The first option lists all the elements stated in the provision.
9. (B) Section 18 expressly requires the act to be done 'in a lawful manner by lawful means.' Therefore an unlawful manner or unlawful means would prevent the provision's excuse from applying, even if the result was accidental and there was no criminal intention.
10. (C) Illustration (a) states that if A alters course "without any intention to run down the boat C and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B," he is not guilty provided it is found as a matter of fact that the danger to B excused the risk. The exception depends on that factual finding.
11. (A) Section 20 states, "Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age." This means such an act is not an offence under the provision itself, rather than being punishable or tried.
12. (C) Section 20 applies to a "child under seven years of age," so the wording excludes a child who is exactly seven. The provision therefore does not automatically render acts by a seven-year-old non-offences.
13. (A) Section 21 expressly uses the phrase 'above seven years of age and under twelve years of age,' so the correct formulation is 'above seven and under twelve' rather than inclusive ranges or simply 'under twelve.'
14. (A) Section 22 states that nothing is an offence if the person, at the time of doing it and by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law. The provision requires incapacity at the time of the act due to unsoundness of mind.
15. (D) Section 22 specifies the defence where, by reason of unsoundness of mind, the person is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or its wrongness. The text does not mention voluntary or involuntary intoxication, so intoxication is not expressly included by the provision's wording.
16. (A) The proviso to Section 23 expressly requires that the intoxicating thing was administered without the person's knowledge or against his will. Voluntariness, insanity certification, or triviality are not part of the text.
17. (A) Section 23 applies only where the intoxication renders the person incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law, and the intoxicant was administered without his knowledge or against his will. If despite involuntary intoxication the person still knew the nature and wrongness of the act, the provision does not apply.
18. (B) Section 24 makes clear that where an act is not an offence unless done with particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act while intoxicated "shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated," meaning voluntary intoxication does not negate the required intent.
19. (B) Section 25 states that nothing which is not intended to cause death or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of harm to any person above eighteen years of age who has given consent. Thus protection applies only where there is no intent to cause death/grievous hurt and the doer does not know the act is likely to cause such harm, and the consenting person is adult.
20. (D) Section 25 also covers harm "which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm." Thus even where the doer knows the act is likely to cause harm, it is not an offence if the consenting adult has accepted the risk.
21. (C) The provision refers to the person 'for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent.' Thus consent must come from the person for whose benefit the act is done and may be express or implied.
22. (C) Section 26 states protection applies even where the harm 'may be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause' death, so long as there is no intention to cause death, it is done in good faith for the person's benefit, and that person has consented. Thus it is not an offence under those conditions.
23. (C) The proviso and the illustration show that acts done in good faith for the cure of the child, even if known to be likely to cause death, are within the exception where there is no intention to cause death. The illustration explicitly states A is within the exception.
24. (A) Section 28(a) states that consent is not such a consent if it is given by a person under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact and the actor knows or has reason to believe it was given for that reason. The provision refers specifically to fear of injury (and misconception of fact), not to a misconception of law or mere adulthood.
25. (D) Section 28(b) states that consent is not such a consent if it is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent. Mere intoxication alone does not invalidate consent unless it causes inability to understand.
26. (C) The illustration in Section 29 states: 'Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is an offence independently of any harm... Therefore... the consent of the woman or of her guardian... does not justify the act.'
27. (A) Section 30 states an act is not an offence if done in good faith for the person's benefit without consent when it is impossible for that person to signify consent or they are incapable and no guardian can be reached in time. The other options contradict the text (express refusal, pecuniary benefit, or need for later ratification).
28. (B) The proviso states the exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence 'to the committing of which offence it would not extend', meaning abetment is excluded only where the underlying offence is one excluded by the proviso (e.g., intentional causing of death). Abetment of acts to which the exception does extend is not disallowed by this proviso.
29. (C) Section 31 qualifies the protection by stating it applies when the communication is made in good faith and for the benefit of the person to whom it is made. If the communication was not for that person's benefit, the provision's protection does not apply.
30. (C) The provision begins: "Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled..." Therefore both murder and offences against the State punishable with death are excluded from the exception.
31. (B) Explanation 1 denies the benefit to someone who of his own accord, or by reason of a non-instant-death threat, joins a gang knowing their character. Explanation 2 gives the example of a smith seized and forced by threat of instant death who is entitled to the exception. Therefore only the seized smith is entitled.
32. (C) The provision expressly lists three circumstances—causing harm, intending to cause harm, or knowing it likely to cause harm—and exempts them from criminality if the harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain. All three scenarios are therefore covered by the Section's condition.
33. (B) Section 33 uses the formulation 'no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm,' which establishes an objective ordinary‑person standard. The text does not invoke a legal expert's test or any separate statutory 'reasonable person' criteria.
34. (C) The plain text of Section 34 says, "Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence," therefore such acts are described as not being offences under this provision.
35. (A) Section 35(a) expressly gives every person the right to defend his own body and the body of any other person against any offence affecting the human body. The provision names both 'his own body' and 'the body of any other person'.
36. (D) Section 35 begins by stating the right is 'subject to the restrictions contained in section 37', so the right is not absolute but is limited by those specified restrictions. The correct limitation reference is section 37 as per the provision.
37. (D) Section 36 lists "youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or ... any misconception on the part of that person." It does not mention 'mistake of law'.
38. (A) Section 36 includes intoxication among the reasons an act may not be that offence and expressly provides that "every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence."
39. (C) Section 37(1)(c) provides that there is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities. The provision removes the right when timely official protection is available.
40. (A) Section 38(d) explicitly includes 'an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust.' The other options are not enumerated in the provision.
41. (B) Section 38 begins by stating the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death 'under the restrictions specified in section 37,' so the right is not absolute but limited by those restrictions. The other options are not supported by the text.
42. (C) Section 39 allows the voluntary causing of any harm other than death when the offence is not of the descriptions in section 38, but it qualifies that such action is subject to the restrictions specified in section 37. Thus grievous hurt (a harm other than death) would be covered only under those restrictions.
43. (A) Section 40 states the right of private defence of the body "commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed." Thus it can begin before the offence is committed.
44. (C) Section 40 specifies the right of private defence commences "as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises," so the apprehension must be reasonable; mere unreasonable fear is not sufficient under this provision.
45. (B) Clause (b) of Section 41 specifies 'house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise' as an offence for which private defence of property may extend to causing death. The provision restricts this to the night period, not daytime.
46. (B) The opening words of Section 41 state the right extends when 'the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right,' thus expressly including attempts to commit the listed offences as qualifying for the extension.
47. (A) Section 42 provides that while the right 'does not extend to the voluntary causing of death,' it 'does extend... to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death,' but this extension is 'subject to the restrictions specified in section 37.'
48. (A) Clause (a) states the right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences. The provision does not make commencement depend on actual damage, entry, or notification.
49. (A) Clause (e) specifies that against house‑breaking after sunset and before sunrise the right continues as long as the house‑trespass begun by such house‑breaking continues. It is tied to continuation of the trespass, not merely time of day or arrest.
50. (C) The illustration explicitly states: "A commits no offence if by so firing he harms any of the children." Thus, under the circumstances described, A is not criminally liable for harming the innocent children while exercising private defence.