Judiciary & appointments
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (NJAC Judgment)
Supreme Court of India · 2015 · (2015) 5 SCC 1
The government had tried to change how judges are appointed to the Supreme Court and High Courts by creating a new commission that included the Law Minister and other non-judges alongside senior judges. The Supreme Court struck down this new system, ruling that it threatened judicial independence by giving the executive too much influence over who becomes a judge. As a result, the older 'collegium' system, where senior judges themselves largely decide on judicial appointments, was restored and continues today.
The story
In 2014, Parliament tried something unprecedented: after decades of judges effectively choosing judges through an opaque 'collegium,' it created the National Judicial Appointments Commission, bringing in the Law Minister and eminent citizens to have a real say in selecting judges. Advocates and civil society groups had long criticized the collegium as secretive and unaccountable, and the amendment sailed through with near-unanimous political support, ratified by half the state legislatures. But the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association pushed back, arguing that letting politicians into the appointments room was a Trojan horse threatening judicial independence itself. The five-judge bench wrestled with a deep tension: reform versus restraint, accountability versus insulation. In October 2015, by a striking 4:1 vote, the Court struck down the NJAC, ruling that any process letting the executive have a decisive voice in judicial appointments violated the Constitution's basic structure. The lone dissenter, Justice Chelameswar, warned the collegium's flaws were being ignored. The ruling restored the collegium, leaving the judiciary firmly in charge of its own composition—a decision still debated as either a guardian of independence or a barrier to accountability.
The facts
The Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 sought to replace the judge-led collegium system with a National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) for appointing judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts. The NJAC comprised the Chief Justice of India, two senior-most SC judges, the Law Minister, and two eminent persons selected by a committee including the Prime Minister and Leader of Opposition. The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and others challenged the constitutional validity of this amendment and Act, arguing it undermined judicial independence. A five-judge Constitution Bench heard the matter.
The question before the court
Whether the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act and the NJAC Act, by altering the process of judicial appointments to include executive and lay participation with a veto-like power, violated the basic structure of the Constitution by compromising the independence of the judiciary.
The holding
By a 4:1 majority, the Supreme Court struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act and the NJAC Act as unconstitutional, holding that they violated the basic structure doctrine by damaging the primacy of the judiciary in matters of appointment and transfer of judges, and by permitting the possibility of executive influence (through the Law Minister and the mechanism for eminent persons, including a veto by any two NJAC members) to override judicial opinion. The Court held judicial independence, and specifically primacy of the judiciary in appointments, to be an inviolable feature of the basic structure. Consequently, the pre-existing collegium system under the Second and Third Judges cases was revived. Justice Chelameswar dissented, upholding the NJAC as a valid legislative response to defects in the collegium system.
The principle it stands for
Primacy of the judiciary in the appointment and transfer of judges is an essential and inviolable component of judicial independence, which forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be diluted even by constitutional amendment. Any mechanism for judicial appointments that permits the executive or non-judicial members to have an effective veto or decisive say over judicial appointments is unconstitutional as it compromises the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary.
Provisions this case shaped
- Art. 124Establishment and constitution of Supreme Courtinterpreted — Original appointment provision for Supreme Court judges reaffirmed via revived collegium system.
- Art. 50Separation of judiciary from executiveupheld — Principle of separation of judiciary from executive reinforced as part of basic structure.
- Art. 368Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure thereforinterpreted — Amending power held limited by the basic structure doctrine, which barred insertion of the NJAC scheme.
AI-assisted summary from public records. Read the full judgment on Indian Kanoon.