Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

The story

In November 2012, two young women in a Mumbai suburb faced arrest for a Facebook post and a mere 'like' questioning a citywide shutdown after a political leader's death. Their arrest under Section 66A of the IT Act sparked national outrage, revealing how a vaguely worded cyber law was being weaponised against ordinary citizens for online criticism, jokes, and dissent. Shreya Singhal, then a law student, decided to challenge the law itself, filing a public interest petition in the Supreme Court arguing that Section 66A's language—criminalising anything 'grossly offensive' or 'annoying'—handed the state unchecked power to silence speech. The case became a rallying point for civil liberties groups, journalists, and internet users who had witnessed a spate of arrests over cartoons, tweets, and posts. In March 2015, the Supreme Court delivered a resounding verdict: it struck down Section 66A completely, declaring it unconstitutional for its chilling effect on free expression and its dangerous vagueness. The Court also clarified the limited circumstances under which websites could be blocked and intermediaries held liable, insisting on due process rather than arbitrary takedown demands. The judgment was celebrated as a defining moment for digital free speech in India, curbing state overreach and reaffirming that citizens cannot be jailed simply for expressing opinions online.

The facts

Two young women in Maharashtra were arrested under Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 for a Facebook post and a 'like' questioning a shutdown called after a political leader's death. Law student Shreya Singhal filed a PIL in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of Section 66A, along with related provisions Section 69A (blocking of websites) and Section 79 (intermediary liability) and the accompanying IT Rules, arguing they violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.

The question before the court

Whether Section 66A of the IT Act, which criminalised sending 'offensive', 'menacing', or 'annoying' information online, violated Article 19(1)(a) and was not saved as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2); and whether Sections 69A and 79 and the intermediary guidelines were constitutionally valid.

The holding

The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act in its entirety, holding it unconstitutional for being vague, overbroad, and having a chilling effect on free speech, with no proximate or reasonable nexus to any of the restrictions permitted under Article 19(2). The Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 69A and the blocking rules, finding adequate procedural safeguards. It also upheld Section 79 and the intermediary guidelines but read them down to require that intermediaries need only act upon receiving actual knowledge via a court order or government notification, rather than being obligated to proactively judge and remove content themselves.

The principle it stands for

Any law restricting speech under Article 19(2) must be narrowly and precisely worded so citizens can know what is prohibited; vague and overbroad penal provisions that create a chilling effect on protected speech cannot be sustained. Mere discussion, advocacy, or annoyance/inconvenience caused by speech does not amount to incitement or a threat to public order sufficient to justify criminalisation. Intermediary liability for third-party content can only be triggered by actual knowledge through a proper legal or governmental order, not by private complaints or subjective discretion.

Provisions this case shaped

• Art. 19Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etcinterpreted — Court held free speech restrictions must fit strictly within Article 19(2) grounds and be narrowly tailored.