M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak)

The story

Just after the horror of Bhopal, another gas leak struck Delhi—this time from a Shriram Foods and Fertilizers plant, killing a lawyer and sickening residents living nearby. Advocate M.C. Mehta, already fighting in court to have the hazardous unit shut down or moved out of the crowded city, watched his worst fears become real as the very danger he warned against poured into the streets. Families of the injured and dead had no clear way to hold the powerful company accountable under old tort rules, which were full of escape clauses for accidents deemed 'unavoidable.' The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati, refused to let technicalities shield industries from responsibility. It declared that any enterprise choosing to run inherently dangerous operations must answer absolutely for any harm caused, no matter how careful they claimed to be. The Court also asserted its own power to award compensation directly, without forcing victims into lengthy civil suits. For ordinary people living beside factories and chemical plants across India, this was no longer an abstract legal debate—it meant that if disaster struck again, the law would stand firmly on their side, not behind corporate excuses.

The facts

Oleum gas leaked from a unit of Shriram Foods and Fertilizers Industries in Delhi shortly after the Bhopal gas tragedy, causing the death of an advocate and injuries to several persons in the surrounding area. M.C. Mehta had already filed a public interest litigation seeking closure/relocation of the hazardous plant; the leak occurred while that petition was pending. The Court had to decide the scope of its remedial power under Article 32 and the liability standard applicable to enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous industries.

The question before the court

Whether the Supreme Court under Article 32 could award compensation for violation of fundamental rights caused by private industrial enterprises, and what standard of liability should govern enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities.

The holding

The Supreme Court held that an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results, and if harm does result, the enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate all those affected, without any exceptions of the kind recognized under the traditional rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. The Court further held that it possesses the power under Article 32 to forge new remedies and evolve new principles of liability where existing law is found inadequate to protect fundamental rights, including the power to award compensation directly in proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights.

The principle it stands for

Where an enterprise engages in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry that poses a potential threat to the health and safety of persons in and around it, it owes an absolute, non-delegable duty to the community, and liability for any resulting harm is absolute, unaffected by exceptions available under ordinary tort principles. The Supreme Court, as guardian of fundamental rights under Article 32, can evolve new remedies and measures of damages appropriate to modern industrial society to enforce those rights.

Provisions this case shaped

• Art. 21Protection of life and personal libertyexpanded — Right to life read to include protection from hazardous industrial harm, grounding absolute liability.
• Art. 32Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Partexpanded — Recognized Supreme Court's power to award compensation and craft new remedies for fundamental rights violations.