Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Section 99
Evidence as to application of language which can apply to one only of several persons
When the facts are such that the language used might have been meant to apply to any one, and could not have been meant to apply to more than one, of several persons or things, evidence may be given of facts which show which of those persons or things it was intended to apply to. Illustrations.
(a) A agrees to sell to B, for one thousand rupees, “my white horse”. A has two white horses. Evidence may be given of facts which show which of them was meant.
(b) A agrees to accompany B to Ramgarh. Evidence may be given of facts showing whether Ramgarh in Rajasthan or Ramgarh in Uttarakhand was meant.
Why this exists
Everyday language is often imprecise — names, descriptions, or places can accidentally match more than one thing. This rule, carried forward from the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 99), ensures that when a document or statement is ambiguous in this specific way (it fits only one person/thing at a time, but which one is unclear), courts aren't left guessing. Instead, they can hear evidence — like surrounding circumstances, prior dealings, or context — to identify the true intended meaning, rather than striking down the whole agreement for vagueness.
Common misconceptions
- Myth: This rule lets courts guess or assume facts freely.
Fact: Courts don't guess — they only allow relevant, provable outside evidence (like conduct or communications) to identify which specific person or thing was meant. - Myth: This applies whenever any word is unclear or vague.
Fact: It applies only to a specific kind of ambiguity — where the words fit exactly one of several options, but it's unclear which one, not general vagueness or confusion.