The Constitution of India
Article 75
Other provisions as to Ministers
(1) The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister.
(1A) The total number of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, in the Council of Ministers shall not exceed fifteen per cent. of the total number of members of the House of the People.
(1B) A member of either House of Parliament belonging to any political party who is disqualified for being a member of that House under paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule shall also be disqualified to be appointed as a Minister under clause (1) for duration of the period commencing from the date of his disqualification till the date on which the term of his office as such member would expire or where he contests any election to either House of Parliament before the expiry of such period, till the date on which he is declared elected, whichever is earlier.
(2) The Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.
(3) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People.
(4) Before a Minister enters upon his office, the President shall administer to him the oaths of office and of secrecy according to the forms set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule.
(5) A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of either House of Parliament shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister.
(6) The salaries and allowances of Ministers shall be such as Parliament may from time to time by law determine and, until Parliament so determines, shall be as specified in the Second Schedule.
Why this exists
Article 75 lays down the structural rules of India's parliamentary system, borrowed from the British model of cabinet government. It ensures the executive (Council of Ministers) is chosen through the President but is really accountable to the elected Lok Sabha, embodying the principle of responsible government. Clauses 1A and 1B were added later (91st Amendment, 2003) to curb bloated cabinets and prevent defection-driven opportunism from tainting ministerial appointments.
How courts read it
The Supreme Court, notably in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), clarified that the 'pleasure of the President' under clause (2) is not personal discretion but is guided by whether the Council of Ministers retains the confidence of the Lok Sabha, reinforcing collective responsibility under clause (3). Courts have also held that a person who is not a member of either House can still be appointed Minister but must get elected within six months, as per clause (5), tying ministerial legitimacy to democratic representation.
Common misconceptions
- Myth: The President can dismiss the Prime Minister or Ministers whenever he personally wishes.
Fact: Courts have clarified that 'pleasure of the President' under clause (2) is exercised on the advice of the Council of Ministers as long as it enjoys the confidence of the Lok Sabha, not as an independent presidential power. - Myth: A Minister must always be a sitting MP at the time of appointment.
Fact: A person who is not currently an MP can be appointed Minister, but under clause (5) they must become a member of either House within six months or lose the position.