The Constitution of India
Article 148
Comptroller and Auditor-General of India
(1) There shall be a Comptroller and Auditor-General of India who shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal and shall only be removed from office in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court.
(2) Every person appointed to be the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the President, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule.
(3) The salary and other conditions of service of the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall be such as may be determined by Parliament by law and, until they are so determined, shall be as specified in the Second Schedule:
Provided that neither the salary of a Comptroller and Auditor-General nor his rights in respect of leave of absence, pension or age of retirement shall be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment.
(4) The Comptroller and Auditor-General shall not be eligible for further office either under the Government of India or under the Government of any State after he has ceased to hold his office.
(5) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any law made by Parliament, the conditions of service of persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and the administrative powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the President after consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor-General.
(6) The administrative expenses of the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, including all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the persons serving in that office, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India.
Why this exists
The framers wanted an independent watchdog to check how the government spends public money, since accountability for finances is central to democratic governance. They modeled the CAG's independence on judicial protections given to Supreme Court judges, ensuring the auditor could scrutinize the executive without fear of removal, pay cuts, or being tempted by post-retirement government jobs. This mirrors the British tradition of an independent Comptroller and Auditor-General.
How courts read it
There is no single landmark case reinterpreting Article 148 itself, but courts and constitutional commentators have repeatedly cited the CAG's security of tenure and salary protections as evidence of the framers' intent to insulate financial audit and accountability functions from executive pressure, similar to judicial independence. The Supreme Court has referred to CAG reports in several public interest litigations (e.g., on the 2G spectrum allocation case) as credible material for judicial review of government decisions, underscoring the practical weight given to the CAG's independent findings.
Common misconceptions
- Myth: The CAG can be removed by the government whenever it wants, like any other officer.
Fact: The CAG can only be removed in the same way and on the same grounds as a Supreme Court judge, which requires a special parliamentary process, not a simple government order. - Myth: The CAG's reports have direct legal power to cancel government contracts or punish officials.
Fact: The CAG's role is to audit and report; any legal consequences come later through Parliament, investigative agencies, or courts acting on those findings. - Myth: The CAG can take up a ministerial or government advisory role after retiring, like many other officials do.
Fact: Article 148(4) specifically bars the CAG from holding any further office under the central or state government after leaving the post.