सं Samvidhan

The Constitution of India

Article 145

Rules of Court, etc

Why this exists

The framers wanted the Supreme Court to have control over its own internal procedures rather than depend entirely on Parliament for every operational detail, since courts often need flexibility to manage caseloads, appeals, and emergencies. At the same time, they built in checks: presidential approval for rules, and a mandatory minimum of five judges for weighty constitutional questions, to ensure major decisions on interpreting the Constitution get broader deliberation rather than being decided by just one or two judges.

How courts read it

Courts have generally treated Article 145 as an enabling provision, letting the Supreme Court frame its own Rules (like the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and 2013) covering filing, hearing, and review procedures. On the five-judge requirement in clause (3), courts have debated what counts as a 'substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution' — not every case touching the Constitution needs five judges, only ones genuinely requiring interpretation of a constitutional provision. The Supreme Court has also relied on this Article to justify practice directions and to explain why certain matters (like curative petitions, born out of its review jurisdiction under clause 1(e)) follow special internal procedures, as seen in *Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra* (2002).

Common misconceptions
  • Myth: The Supreme Court can make any rule it wants without any checks.
    Fact: Rules under Article 145 need the President's approval and must not conflict with any law Parliament has made.
  • Myth: Any case mentioning the Constitution automatically needs five judges.
    Fact: Only cases involving a 'substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution' require a minimum five-judge bench under clause (3); routine cases don't need this.
  • Myth: A dissenting judge's opinion doesn't count for anything.
    Fact: Clause (5) explicitly protects a judge's right to write a dissenting judgment or opinion even though the majority view is what's legally binding.